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Abstract 
Social transfers vary enormously across the European Union, as has been demonstrated in earlier 
research. This paper analyses the comparative effects of these transfers on inequality and poverty, 
using consistent household data. The analysis shows that the distributional impact of these transfers 
is greater in countries that spend a higher proportion of their GDP on them, but that there are other 
important determinants, including the extent of means testing, the distribution of funds between 
different types of transfer and the degree of targeting for each transfer. It also shows that effective 
targeting can be achieved without high levels of means testing. 
JEL classification: I38, H55. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the distributional effects of social 
transfers in Member States of the European Union, in order to identify 
differences between countries in the extent to which transfers reduce poverty and 
inequality, and to relate those differences to characteristics of the social 
programmes, such as their share of GDP and the degree of targeting that they 
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employ. This analysis will allow the debates on welfare reform that are taking 
place in many European countries to be informed by a cross-national 
perspective. 
Comparisons are often made between the social transfer systems in different 
countries (see Eardley et al. (1996), for example), but these are usually 
conducted in broad terms, such as their method of administration, share of GDP 
or extent of means testing. Studies that directly compare the effects of the 
transfers on the overall distribution of income are much harder to find. One 
example (Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding, 1996, ch. 7) shows why this might 
be so: the national data-sets that have been available typically do not provide 
data that are fully comparable across countries. This difficulty has recently been 
substantially reduced for EU countries by the establishment of the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP) survey, which uses a common 
questionnaire to collect data from households in almost all Member States on a 
consistent basis. It is the availability of this new data source that makes the 
present paper possible.
1 
Of course, as Atkinson (1995) argues in his discussion of means testing, 
poverty reduction and income redistribution are not the only purposes of social 
transfer systems. Other purposes include the provision of insurance that the 
private sector is unwilling to provide (such as unemployment insurance) and 
redistribution of family income through time (such as child benefits and 
retirement pensions), motivated by a combination of market imperfection and 
individuals’ short-sighted behaviour. Of course, such insurance and forced 
saving reduce poverty and inequality at any point in time, even if they do not 
significantly redistribute lifetime incomes. However, a large part of the 
expenditure is intended for households that are not poor, and so the analysis 
presented below is not a full comparative evaluation of the social transfer 
systems of EU countries. Nonetheless, poverty reduction is a major aim of such 
transfer systems, and their impact on the overall income distribution is an 
important aspect of their effects. These are, therefore, aspects of the social 
transfer system that require a full analysis in order to provide a sound basis for 
policy. 
In order to provide a basis for the main analysis, Section II provides basic 
information on the social protection expenditure patterns of all 15 EU countries. 
Section III briefly describes the ECHP data and the methodology for estimating 
the distributional effects of cash transfer payments. Section IV presents the 
effects of social transfers on the overall distribution of income, while Section V 
considers their effect on poverty. Section VI concludes by summarising the 
results and discussing their implications. 
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II. SOCIAL EXPENDITURE PATTERNS IN THE EU 
The purpose of this section is to outline the broad characteristics of the social 
transfer expenditures, referred to by Eurostat as ‘expenditures on social 
protection’, in terms of factors that can be expected to affect their distributional 
impact: the share of transfer expenditure in GDP, the proportion of it that is 
means-tested and its distribution between different types of benefit. 
Table 1 reports the share of expenditure in GDP, the percentage that is 
means-tested and the split between transfers in cash and in kind.
2 This is a 
picture of great diversity: the share of social protection expenditure in GDP 
varies from 16.9 per cent for Portugal to 37.6 per cent for Sweden; the 
percentage that is means-tested ranges from 0.9 in Greece to 39.9 in Ireland; the 
ratio of cash to kind is as low as 1.6 for Sweden but as high as 10.6 for Greece. 
The main analysis in this paper relates to cash transfers, and so it is interesting to 
note that the degree of variability for cash transfers is not as large as for total 
expenditure. The same countries show generally high or generally low cash 
expenditure as did for total expenditure, but there are several changes in relative 
position. 
TABLE 1 
Expenditures on Social Protection in EU Member States, 1991 
  Total 
expenditure 




(% of GDP) 
In kind 
(% of GDP) 
Ratio of cash 
to kind 
Austria 27.3  6.0  — — — 
Belgium 27.6 2.9  19.9 6.3 3.1 
Denmark 30.7  7.0 19.1 10.8  1.8 
Finland 31.1  2.0  19.4  10.8  1.8 
France  28.5 9.7  19.5 7.5 2.6 
Germany 27.0  11.8 16.6  7.8  2.1 
Greece  20.2 0.9  17.3 1.6  10.6 
Ireland 20.9  39.9  13.0  6.9  1.9 
Italy  24.6 8.8  16.8 6.5 2.6 
Luxembourg  27.6 — 19.5 7.0 2.8 
Netherlands 32.5  11.8  24.6  6.4  3.8 
Portugal 16.9 4.6  10.5 5.5 1.9 
Spain  21.7 8.1  15.5 5.3 2.9 
Sweden 37.6  6.7  22.7  13.9 1.6 
UK 24.7  30.9  15.7  7.9  2.0 
Notes: Cash and kind do not sum to total because total includes administrative costs and ‘other current 
expenditure’. ‘—’ indicates that data are not available. 
Sources: Eurostat (1994); Eardley et al. (1996); authors’ calculations. 
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If the degree to which the expenditures are targeted on the poor were the 
same in each country, we would expect Sweden and the Netherlands to be more 
effective at countering poverty than Portugal, Greece, Ireland and Spain, with the 
other countries somewhere in between. However, the data on means testing in 
Table 1 suggest that the expenditures are not all equally targeted. Greece, 
Finland, Belgium and Portugal spend less than 5 per cent of their social transfers 
on means-tested benefits, while Ireland and the UK spend more than 30 per cent. 
These figures should be interpreted with care, as means testing is not the same as 
targeting. For example, spending on single mothers could be well targeted if they 
are a poor group, even if the money is not explicitly means-tested. However, the 
large differences in the use of means testing warn that it is not sufficient to look 
only at the share of social transfer expenditure in GDP to judge its distributional 
effect. One aspect of social transfer expenditure that affects its targeting is its 
distribution by type of benefit, and this is reported in Table 2. This shows that 
most countries spend the largest share of their social transfer budgets on the old, 
in the form of old-age and survivors’ benefits.
3 The next highest share is 
generally sickness, invalidity and injury benefits.
4 In contrast, the relative 
importance of the other benefits varies considerably between countries: Ireland, 
Sweden, Austria, Finland, Denmark and the UK spend quite heavily on the 
family, and Spain, Ireland, Denmark and Belgium spend substantial amounts on 
the unemployed. Only the Nordic countries and Ireland devote much expenditure 
to maternity, while the UK, Ireland, France and Denmark are the only countries 
with significant housing expenditure. Placing expenditures are relatively high in 
Denmark, Finland, Portugal, Ireland and Germany but, as they are normally 
provided in kind rather than cash, they would not influence the measured 
distribution of income. 
In considering the distributional implications of the figures presented in 
Table 2, it is useful to distinguish between three basic ways in which a benefit 
can be related to income: (i) it can be earnings-related, so that recipients in 
higher income deciles generally receive higher benefits; (ii) it can be flat-rate, so 
that recipients in all income deciles receive the same amounts; or (iii) it can be 
means-tested, so that recipients in lower income deciles receive larger amounts. 
However, the distributional impact will also be affected by the proportion of 
people in each decile who are to be eligible for the benefit. For example, a flat-
rate payment for children could result in larger payments to lower deciles if 
families with several children are more likely to be poor than the rest of the 
population. 
Economic theory would suggest that, given the choice, people with higher 
earnings will want to make larger insurance provisions for these earnings and  
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TABLE 2 
Percentage Allocation of Social Protection Benefits by Type (in Cash + in Kind), 1991 
  Sickness Invalidity Injury Old-age Survivors’ Maternity Family Placing
a Unemployed Housing Miscellaneous 
Austria
b 25.5  10.1  0.0  34.1  10.3  0.0  12.9  0.0  5.3  0.4  1.4 
Belgium 23.7  9.0  2.1  33.1  10.9  0.9  7.6  1.5 9.7  0.0  1.5 
Denmark 19.7  8.6  0.8  35.6  0.1  1.7  10.1  4.8  11.6  2.3 4.6 
Finland 24.8  13.8  1.8  30.5  3.9  2.5  10.7  3.5  5.6  0.9  2.0 
France 26.4  6.0  2.1  36.6  7.5  1.5  8.1  1.1  6.2  2.9  1.5 
Germany 28.7  9.0  3.1  29.4  11.6  0.9  8.1  2.2 3.6  0.7 2.7 
Greece 9.4  10.2  0.1  59.4  10.3  0.7  1.1  0.0  3.0  0.7  5.1 
Ireland 28.7  6.4  0.5  21.6  6.6  2.2  15.2  2.3  11.3  3.3  1.9 
Italy 24.5  6.6  2.3  49.8  10.7  0.5  3.7  0.1  1.7  0.0  0.0 
Luxembourg 24.0  11.7 3.1  32.5  16.2  1.5  9.6 0.2  0.7  0.2  0.3 
Netherlands 21.5 23.0  0.0  31.6  5.4  0.4  8.1 0.0  8.3  1.1  0.6 
Portugal 27.2  12.2  2.9  32.1  7.0  0.9  5.0  2.5 2.3  0.0  7.8 
Spain 26.0  8.6  2.3  31.2  9.8  0.9  0.7  0.8  17.5  0.6  1.3 
Sweden 32.8  0.0  2.3  40.8  0.0  3.4  13.1  0.0  6.9  0.0  0.7 
UK 21.1  12.3  0.4  40.0  1.4  1.0  10.0  1.5  5.2  5.4  1.6 
a‘Placing’ means finding work, including vocational guidance and mobility. 
bThe data for Austria are for 1994, and the definitions of the types of benefit may be different. 
Sources: Eurostat (1994 and 1997); authors’ calculations. Fiscal Studies 
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save more for retirement. If governments respond to these wishes in the design of 
their social insurance schemes, we would expect the benefits to the old, the sick 
and disabled, and the unemployed to be earnings-related, and this is the case in 
many EU countries. On this basis, Table 2 suggests that a substantial majority of 
transfer expenditures will be earnings-related. This limits their redistributive 
impact but does not eliminate it, as people in these groups tend (perhaps 
temporarily) to have lower incomes than the rest of the population. However, the 
premiss is not entirely true. The UK, for example, has made the main benefits in 
these categories flat-rate and provided means-tested supplements to those at 
particular risk of poverty. This is an extreme example, but some other EU 
countries have flat-rate benefits for some of these categories, and Eardley et al. 
(1996) report a large number of means-tested supplements to the main benefits. 
It is particularly common for benefits to the unemployed to become means-tested 
after a certain period. Thus, these categories of benefit are likely to have a 
redistributive effect, which will differ between countries because of differences 
in the income-relatedness of the benefit payments and (possibly) the income 
positions of the recipients. 
The benefits that are more obviously redistributive are family benefits and 
housing benefits. Housing benefits are typically means-tested and family benefits 
are usually flat-rate, but many countries have a means-tested supplement.
5 In 
addition, families with several children are typically low in the (equivalised) 
income distribution. Table 2 shows that these more redistributive benefits 
generally constitute a rather small part of total expenditure on social transfers 
but that they play a larger part in Ireland, the UK, Austria, Sweden, Denmark 
and Finland. 
Overall, this discussion of the data in Tables 1 and 2 shows that there are a 
number of factors that affect the distributional impact of social transfers and that 
these differ substantially between EU countries. However, data in this form are 
not sufficient to draw clear conclusions as to the relative redistributive impact of 
these transfers in the different countries. It is therefore necessary to look at 
household-level data, and this is where the ECHP becomes important. 
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The ECHP is the first attempt to monitor the living standards of the citizens of 
the EU in a consistent way. Information for the second wave of the ECHP, which 
is used in this paper, was collected in 1995. Members of the sampled households 
were interviewed and detailed information was collected on incomes received in 
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1994 and a range of socioeconomic characteristics. It is this data-set, which 
covers 13 Member States,
6 that is used for the purposes of the paper. 
Our unit of analysis is the population member and we define the income of 
each member as the equivalent net disposable household income per capita for 
the household to which they belong. The equivalence scales we use are the 
‘modified OECD scales’, which assign weights of 1, 0.5 and 0.3 to the household 
head, each of the remaining adults and each child in the household respectively. 
They have been used in a number of empirical poverty studies (Hagenaars, de 
Vos and Zaidi, 1994), and, in comparison with other sets of equivalence scales 
used in empirical distributional studies, the economies of scale they imply lie 
somewhere in the middle of the range (Buhmann et al., 1988). We conducted 
sensitivity analysis which shows that most of the results reported below are 
robust with respect to the choice of equivalence scales. 
The effects of the social transfers are estimated by comparing the distribution 
of incomes including transfers with two hypothetical distributions: (i) where 
social transfers are removed and (ii) where social transfers are reduced by 10 per 
cent. In both cases, it is assumed that no other income changes occur. 
Distribution (i) is reported only for expositional purposes since, if there were no 
social transfers, many members of the population would have been forced to 
make different private arrangements to ensure their survival. Distribution (ii) 
represents the effects of marginal changes to social transfers and, as such, is not 
as clearly hypothetical as distribution (i). However, it could still be objected that 
people would alter other income sources (such as income from employment) if 
this change occurs. Nonetheless, in the absence of reliable estimates of labour 
supply responses in all of the countries considered, it represents a reasonable 
‘first-order’ approximation to the distributional effect of a marginal reduction in 
the transfers. These comparisons are made to examine the distributional effects 
of all the social transfers lumped together as well as the impact of particular 
types of transfers. 
IV. EFFECTS ON INCOME INEQUALITY 
The first question to answer is ‘Are social transfers directed primarily to the top, 
the middle or the bottom of the income distribution?’. An answer to this question 
is provided in Table 3, with a graphical representation in Figures 1 and 2. For 
each country, the figures in the first line are the values of the mean social 
transfers received by the members of each decile, while the figures in the second 
line are the proportions of the social transfers in the total income of each decile. 
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TABLE 3 
Social Transfers in Cash per Decile in Absolute (1
st line) and Relative (2
nd line) Terms in 13 EU Member States, 1994 
  Decile 1  Decile 2  Decile 3  Decile 4  Decile 5  Decile 6  Decile 7  Decile 8  Decile 9  Decile 10 
Austria  1,020 2,283 3,013 2,686 2,783 2,977 3,022 3,133 3,101 4,027 
  40.6 50.1 53.5 41.4 37.5 35.7 31.5 28.6 22.8 18.3 
Belgium  1,808 3,219 3,706 3,545 2,977 2,899 2,578 2,786 3,084 5,350 
  67.9 70.0 63.0 52.0 38.6 33.9 26.6 25.1 23.6 25.9 
Denmark  3,151 4,092 3,650 2,946 2,656 2,257 2,150 2,300 1,898 3,108 
  67.5 63.3 51.2 38.5 32.0 26.0 21.9 21.3 15.1 15.6 
France  1,902 2,169 2,480 2,415 2,372 2,502 2,338 2,523 3,385 5,612 
  63.0 48.3 45.3 38.3 32.4 30.6 25.0 23.1 25.4 26.1 
Germany  1,189 2,569 2,748 2,659 3,119 2,822 2,403 2,782 2,755 4,659 
  47.4 53.3 45.6 38.0 39.1 31.6 24.1 23.9 18.8 20.7 
Greece  804  1,094 1,209  977  1,073 1,335 1,261 1,210 1,396 1,789 
  58.2 45.7 39.8 27.0 25.5 27.4 22.3 18.2 16.9 12.8 
Ireland  1,358 2,345 2,232 1,828 1,292 1,312 1,125 1,049 1,614 5,882 
  71.1 77.5 61.5 45.3 26.4 22.3 16.0 12.2 14.6 29.8 
Italy  594  1,184 1,500 1,645 1,925 2,237 1,880 1,983 2,288 3,790 
  38.3 38.6 39.2 36.9 36.8 36.1 26.8 24.2 23.1 24.1 
Luxembourg  2,047 3,011 4,072 4,582 4,012 5,771 4,143 3,727 3,508 4,632 
  48.2 42.7 46.5 43.9 35.5 42.7 27.9 20.8 16.1 12.1 
Netherlands 1,679 2,794 2,634 2,596 2,215 2,265 2,281 2,179 2,783 4,704 
  56.4 57.5 48.6 42.8 33.5 29.9 25.8 20.4 21.9 23.1 
Portugal  636  1,060 1,121  869  863  869  924  1,214 1,137 2,262 
  59.6 53.5 44.4 28.4 23.8 20.6 18.9 20.3 15.1 16.4 
Spain  792  1,439 1,740 1,603 1,765 1,797 1,589 1,644 1,593 2,006 
  52.3 54.9 51.2 41.6 39.3 35.2 26.9 23.2 18.3 14.3 
UK  1,752 3,000 3,290 2,776 2,494 1,953 1,906 1,904 1,548 2,201 
  69.8 77.1 65.0 49.3 36.9 24.9 20.7 17.5 11.4  9.5 
Notes: The first line of each pair gives the mean value of cash transfers per capita in ecu per year (in purchasing power parity — PPP — terms). The second line 
(in italics) gives the cash transfers as a percentage of total decile income. Distributional Impact of Social Transfers in the EU 
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FIGURE 1 
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FIGURE 2 
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TABLE 4 
Distributional Impact of Social Transfers in Cash in 13 EU Member States, 1994 
  Atkinson index of inequality (e = 0.5)  Gini index of inequality 
  A B C A B C 
Austria  0.072 68.5  3.6  0.290 37.2  2.1 
Belgium  0.070 75.8  5.0  0.287 41.5  2.7 
Denmark  0.047 78.7  6.9  0.226 46.0  4.0 
France  0.071 68.9  3.3  0.292 36.7  1.8 
Germany  0.074 70.8  3.4  0.293 36.9  2.0 
Greece 0.098 60.3  3.1  0.341 26.6  1.5 
Ireland  0.097 67.3  3.8  0.347 31.8  2.0 
Italy  0.084 66.5  1.6  0.312 31.3  1.0 
Luxembourg  0.082 66.5  4.1  0.307 34.9  2.3 
Netherlands  0.063 75.5  4.2  0.269 40.8  2.3 
Portugal  0.114 53.6  2.6  0.371 22.7  1.3 
Spain  0.087 67.5  4.2  0.325 34.2  2.2 
UK  0.091 69.9  6.1  0.332 35.5  3.2 
A:  Distribution of disposable income including cash transfers. 
B:  Proportional decline in inequality due to cash transfers (%). 
C:  Increase in inequality due to a uniform 10 per cent cut in cash transfers (%). 
 
The picture that emerges from these estimates regarding the absolute value of 
social transfers per decile in the EU Member States is quite diverse. In most of 
the countries, the members of the top decile enjoy the highest mean social 
transfers per capita and these transfers take their lowest values in the bottom 
decile. In Austria, Greece and Italy, social transfers tend to rise as equivalent 
income rises, whereas, leaving aside the top decile, the opposite is observed in 
Denmark, Ireland and the UK. If the two extreme deciles are ignored, no clear 
association between social transfers and disposable income is observed in the 
rest of the countries. In contrast, all countries show a clear negative association 
between disposable income and the share of income due to cash social transfers. 
The decline in the share of social transfers is steepest in the UK and least 
pronounced in Italy. 
The evidence of Table 3 implies that, since social transfers account for a 
larger share of the incomes of the poor than of the rich, it is likely that they 
contribute to a decline in total inequality. The validity of this hypothesis is 
confirmed in Tables 4 and 5. The first column of Table 4 reports estimates of the 
Atkinson index (when the value of the inequality-aversion parameter is set at 
e = 0.5) for the distribution of equivalent disposable income per capita. The 
second column reports the proportional decline between the level of inequality 
that would have been recorded if there were no social transfers and the current 
level of inequality. The third column reports the impact that a uniform 10 per Distributional Impact of Social Transfers in the EU 
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cent cut in social transfers would have on the index. The last three columns of 
the table repeat the exercise for the Gini index.
7 
The inequality indices highlight similar patterns. Although there exist a few 
differences in their rankings for columns A, both indices take their lowest values 
in Denmark and the Netherlands and their highest in the Mediterranean 
countries, Ireland and the UK. Intermediate levels of inequality are recorded in 
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg. Columns B show that both 
indices suggest that the impact of cash social transfers is most important in 
Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands and least so in Portugal and Greece. The 
estimates reported in columns C of the table suggest that, at the margin, social 
transfers are most effective in reducing inequality in Denmark and the UK and 
least so in Portugal and, particularly, Italy.
8 
Comparing these results with Table 1, it is clear that, as one would expect, 
the countries with transfer systems that are most effective in reducing inequality 
are those that spend a high proportion of GDP on transfers. However, there is not 
a perfect correlation: Italy spends more than the UK on cash transfers but is less 
effective at reducing inequality. It is therefore necessary to look in more detail to 
understand fully the results in Table 4, which may be driven by the extent to 
which transfers are targeted towards the poorest segments of the population, in 
addition to the level of expenditure.  
In order to disentangle the corresponding effects, we employ the technique of 
inequality decomposition by factor component. Following Pyatt, Chen and Fei 
(1980), if there are K income components and the population is ranked in 











= ∑ , 
where m and mk denote respectively the mean equivalent income and the mean 
equivalent income of type k in the population (k = 1,…,K), Gk denotes the Gini 
coefficient for the distribution of income component k and Rk denotes the 
relative correlation coefficient of component k, which is defined as the ratio of 
the covariance between this component, yk, and the rank of total income, r, to the 
covariance between the component, yk, and its own rank, rk; that is, 
                                                                                                                                    
7Details of the Atkinson and Gini indices and other measures of inequality are described in Cowell (2000). 
8The same exercise was also performed for other values of the inequality-aversion parameter of the Atkinson 
index as well as for members of the extended Gini family of indices. In most cases, the more sensitive the index 
to changes at the bottom end of the distribution, the larger the aggregate as well as the marginal impact of 





















= ∑ , 
where wk = mk/m is the share of component k in total income and gk = RkGk/G is 
the relative concentration coefficient of component k in aggregate inequality.
9 
Therefore  wkgk  is the proportional contribution of component k to aggregate 
inequality. Ceteris paribus, an equiproportionate increase in incomes of type k 
will cause an increase or decline in aggregate inequality if gk is greater or less 
than one. Further, using equation (1), we can calculate the elasticity of G with 









== − . 
Estimates of wk, gk and ek are reported in Table 5 for all cash social transfers 
taken together and for each individual component: pensions, sickness and 
invalidity benefits, family benefits, unemployment benefits and other benefits. 
The estimates of the second column show that, in all countries, social transfers 
mitigate aggregate inequality, since all gks are less than one (in all but one case 
less than 0.5). Nevertheless, a number of cross-country differences are also 
observed. The most egalitarian distributions of social transfers are recorded in 
Denmark and the UK, where the relative concentration coefficients, gk, are 
negative. At the other extreme, we find Italy, where gk takes its highest value, 
0.716. The differences in wk and gk lead naturally to differences in the elasticity 
of inequality with respect to social transfers, ek: highest (in absolute terms) in 
Denmark (–0.361) and the UK (–0.301) and lowest in Italy (–0.075) and Portugal 
(–0.117). This is consistent with the ranking in Table 4.
11 
The UK’s egalitarian distribution of transfers is consistent with its high level 
of means testing, shown in Table 1, but Denmark’s level of means testing is even  
 
                                                                                                                                    
9Note that a negative Rk means that the respective component is negatively correlated with the rank of total 
income and, therefore, the resulting negative gk implies that this component contributes directly to aggregate 
equality rather than inequality. 
10Naturally, the sum of these elasticities for all income components is always equal to zero, since an 
equiproportionate increase of all income components will leave aggregate inequality unaffected. 
11At first sight, the estimates of ek in Table 5 may appear to contradict the implied elasticities of the last column 
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lower than Italy’s, while Ireland is only moderately egalitarian in its distribution 
of transfers despite its high level of means testing. This suggests that we should 
turn our attention to another factor that was identified in Section II as affecting 
targeting: the composition of transfer expenditures. 
The most important type of social transfer in cash is pensions, accounting for 
15–20 per cent of total household income in most countries. The discussion in 
Section II suggested that these could well not be redistributive and, indeed, the 
estimates of gk, being greater than 1, show that in two countries — Ireland and 
France — pensions contribute to inequality rather than equality. On the other 
hand, in Denmark, the corresponding figure is negative. As a result, we observe 
wide variations in the elasticity of G with respect to pensions: from –0.130 in 
Denmark and –0.111 in Greece, to 0.044 in Ireland and 0.002 in France. 
The income share of cash sickness and invalidity benefits varies from 0.6 per 
cent in Greece to 4.4 per cent in the Netherlands. In most cases, the 
corresponding gks are negative, and, in all countries, the elasticity of aggregate 
inequality with respect to sickness and invalidity benefits is negative as well, 
varying from –0.007 in Austria to –0.050 in Denmark. 
The share of family benefits in total household income is extremely low in 
the Mediterranean EU Member States but quite substantial in Belgium, Austria 
and Luxembourg. In all but three of the countries (Portugal, Italy and Denmark), 
the relevant relative concentration coefficients are negative, and the elasticity of 
G with respect to family benefits varies between –0.002 and –0.009 in the 
Mediterranean countries and between –0.043 and –0.076 in the rest of the 
countries under examination. 
Naturally, unemployment benefits play an important role where 
unemployment is high and unemployment compensation relatively generous. For 
very different reasons, their share in total household income varies from 5.9 per 
cent in Ireland and 5.3 per cent in Denmark to 0.2 per cent in Greece and 0.4 per 
cent in Luxembourg. In Ireland, the corresponding elasticity is –0.130, and high 
(negative) values are also recorded in Denmark, Belgium and Spain. 
‘Other’ benefits (mainly housing benefits and social assistance) play an 
important role only in the UK, Denmark and, to a lesser extent, the Netherlands 
and France.
12 In most cases, the relevant gks are negative and large in absolute 
terms. As a consequence, in the above countries, the elasticity of G with respect 
to these benefits is quite substantial: –0.112 in the UK, –0.062 in Denmark, 
–0.054 in the Netherlands and –0.052 in France. 
The overall picture of the role of different transfers in reducing inequality is 
as expected from the discussion in Section II. Insurance benefits, particularly 
pensions, are only weakly redistributive if at all, while benefits targeted at poor 
                                                                                                                                    
12In Table 5, the share of ‘other benefits’ in total household income appears to be relatively high in Germany 
too, at 4.8 per cent. However, this figure is not comparable to the rest of the figures in that column, since it 
contains ‘sickness and invalidity’ and ‘family’ as well as ‘other’ benefits. Distributional Impact of Social Transfers in the EU 
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groups (family benefits, housing benefits and social assistance) are more 
strongly redistributive. 
It is interesting to note that, in all EU Member States examined in Table 5 
apart from the four Mediterranean countries, the combined contribution of the 
non-pension social transfers in reducing inequality is larger than the 
corresponding contribution of pensions, despite the fact that, with the exceptions 
of Denmark and the UK, the combined income share of the non-pension transfers 
is lower than the share of pensions. 
V. EFFECTS ON POVERTY 
This section examines the impact of social transfers on poverty. The relevant 
results are reported in Tables 6 and 7. For the purposes of these tables, we 
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where z is the poverty line, n the size of the population, xi a variable that is equal 
to the equivalent income of the population member if he or she falls below the 
poverty line and equal to z otherwise, and a is a poverty-aversion parameter. The 
poverty line is set at 60 per cent of the median equivalent income.
13 
Similarly to Table 4, columns A of Table 6 report estimates of F for the 
distribution of disposable income for three values of a,
14 while columns B report 
the proportional decline between the level of poverty with no social transfers and 
the current level of poverty, and columns C give the effect of a uniform 10 per 
cent cut in cash social transfers. 
The estimates reported in columns B show that social transfers in cash are 
very important for the alleviation of poverty in all EU Member States. However, 
since these transfers increase the incomes of many population members who 
remain below the poverty line even after the transfers, their effectiveness in 
alleviating poverty appears to increase as the value of a rises. Social transfers 
appear to be most effective in mitigating poverty in Denmark and the 
Netherlands and least so in Portugal and Greece. The results in columns C show 
that the marginal impact appears to be quantitatively most important in Belgium, 
Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK (particularly for a = 2) and least  
 
                                                                                                                                    
13For many countries, this is a similar value to the traditional half of the mean equivalised income, and it has 
the advantage of being less susceptible to extreme values. This poverty line has recently been adopted by 
Eurostat for some of its studies. 
14A value of 0 corresponds to the headcount ratio, 1 corresponds to the poverty gap and 2 puts particular weight 
on the very poorest. Fiscal Studies 
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TABLE 6 
Impact of Cash Transfers on Poverty in 13 EU Member States, 1994 
Foster–Greer–Thorbecke index of poverty 
a = 0  a = 1  a = 2   
A B C A B C A B C 
Austria  0.170 62.4  14.2 0.054 80.2  11.4 0.026 87.7  10.2 
Belgium  0.180 61.0  21.5 0.055 83.2  18.5 0.027 90.6  16.6 
Denmark  0.107 72.3  23.0 0.023 90.7  27.0 0.009 95.8  25.9 
France  0.158 63.5  15.0 0.040 85.2  18.6 0.017 92.3  18.8 
Germany  0.177 56.6  9.8 0.057 79.5  11.1 0.029 87.7  10.1 
Greece 0.207 44.0  9.4 0.070 70.8  9.8 0.035 82.7  11.3 
Ireland  0.212 50.1  17.0 0.049 83.8  27.1 0.019 92.7  27.0 
Italy  0.188 52.7  7.1 0.061 76.3  8.0 0.033 84.9  6.6 
Luxembourg 0.143 66.0  13.0 0.041 83.5  12.0 0.020 90.2  11.7 
Netherlands  0.099 73.6  24.4 0.032 87.9  14.3 0.017 92.6  11.5 
Portugal  0.239 37.7  7.3 0.079 66.9  10.8 0.041 79.2  10.9 
Spain  0.188 55.1  10.0 0.053 81.1  14.6 0.025 89.6  13.6 
UK  0.204 52.3  17.0 0.053 83.1  23.6 0.022 92.0  23.9 
A:  Distribution of disposable income including cash transfers. 
B:  Proportional decline in poverty due to cash transfers (%). 
C:  Increase in poverty due to a uniform 10 per cent cut in cash transfers (%). 
TABLE 7 
Impact of Particular Cash Social Transfers on Aggregate Poverty 
in 13 EU Member States, 1994 (Foster–Greer–Thorbecke index, a = 2) 








  A B A B A B A B A B 
Austria  83.0  4.0 14.5 0.2 44.4 4.4 17.7  0.9  5.2 0.2 
Belgium  85.0  5.9 37.9 1.4 46.0 4.8 48.0  3.3  8.5 0.7 
Denmark  91.2  11.8 64.2 2.7 32.6 1.5 66.4  3.8 57.9 6.1 
France  88.0  6.4 27.2 1.1 44.9 4.1 31.6  1.7 43.2 4.7 
Germany
a  83.7 4.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  31.8 1.7  46.5 3.8 
Greece  81.0  9.7  13.5  0.8 7.6  0.6 1.7 0.3 1.9  0.0 
Ireland  80.9  5.0 44.1 1.9 55.1 6.0 77.8 12.3 14.1 0.8 
Italy  82.6  5.1  20.7  0.6 1.8  0.0 8.5 0.6 2.1  0.0 
Luxembourg 86.3 3.2  33.3 0.6 46.5 5.7  8.1 0.6  24.0 1.1 
Netherlands  86.9  2.3 62.3 1.7 25.0 2.3 50.0  1.7 51.0 3.4 
Portugal  74.5  8.0 20.7 1.2 10.3 0.9 11.6  0.4  3.0 0.2 
Spain  84.0 5.2  52.1  3.2 6.0 0.4  48.6 4.4 9.1 0.8 
UK  80.5  7.1 38.1 1.1 49.6 4.8 12.3  0.7 71.0 9.0 
a‘Other benefits’ for Germany include ‘sickness and invalidity benefits’ and ‘family benefits’. 
A:  Proportional decline in aggregate poverty due to the benefit (%, ceteris paribus). 
B:  Increase in poverty due to a 10 per cent cut in the benefit (%). Distributional Impact of Social Transfers in the EU 
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so in three Mediterranean countries — Italy, Portugal and Greece — as well as 
in Germany and Austria. 
These results suggest that, in general, countries that are effective in using 
social transfers to reduce inequality are also effective in reducing poverty. 
However, it is interesting to note that Ireland is higher in the order of countries 
for reducing poverty than it is for reducing inequality, probably due to the high 
proportion of means testing in Ireland’s social transfers. 
Table 7 is similar to Table 6, but instead of examining the impact on poverty 
of all social transfers taken together, it analyses separately the impact of 
particular types of transfers, when a = 2.
15 In all countries, the significance of 
pensions in alleviating poverty is enormous, while, at the margin, a 10 per cent 
cut in pensions would have the most adverse impact in Denmark (11.8 per cent) 
and Greece (9.7 per cent) and the least adverse in the Netherlands (2.3 per cent). 
For the other transfers, there are important cross-country differences. Sickness 
and invalidity benefits reduce poverty by over 60 per cent in Denmark and the 
Netherlands but by less than 25 per cent in Greece, Austria, Italy and Portugal. 
Family benefits reduce poverty by over 40 per cent in Ireland, the UK, 
Luxembourg, Belgium, France and Austria but by less than 15 per cent in the 
four Mediterranean countries. Even more significant cross-country differences 
are registered regarding the efficacy of unemployment benefits in reducing 
poverty: poverty declines by 77.8 per cent in Ireland and by 66.4 per cent in 
Denmark, the declines in the Netherlands, Spain and Belgium exceed 40 per 
cent, but they are low in the UK, Portugal, Italy, Luxembourg and, especially, 
Greece. ‘Other’ benefits play an important role in reducing poverty in France, 
the Netherlands, Denmark and, particularly, the UK.
16 For all types of benefit, 
the patterns of results in columns B are similar to those in columns A. 
A comparison of these results with those in Table 5 shows that, in general, 
countries where a particular transfer is effective in reducing inequality are also 
those in which the same transfer is effective in reducing poverty. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has examined the impact of cash social transfers on inequality and 
poverty in 13 EU Member States, using data from the European Community 
Household Panel. The results show that, at least from a static point of view, 
these transfers help to reduce both inequality and poverty in all countries, but 
with significant cross-country differences. The impact on inequality and poverty 
is most significant in countries that spend a high proportion of their GDP on 
social transfers, such as Denmark and the Netherlands, and least so in low-
                                                                                                                                    
15Similar but less pronounced results were obtained when a was set at 0 and 1. 
16Again, the figure for Germany is not comparable to the rest of the figures in the column, because it contains 
‘sickness and invalidity’ and ‘family’ as well as ‘other’ benefits. Fiscal Studies 
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spending countries, such as Portugal and Greece. Also, there is a high marginal 
impact in countries with a high degree of means testing: the UK for both 
inequality and poverty and Ireland for poverty. However, the example of 
Denmark shows that transfer payments can be well targeted without extensive 
means testing. 
Within these broad results, there are variations between countries that cannot 
be explained simply by expenditure levels or the extent of means testing. The 
distributional and poverty reduction impact depends also on the distribution of 
funds between different types of transfer and the detailed design of each transfer. 
The most important type of social transfer is pensions and, in most cases, they 
make the highest individual contribution to reducing inequality and poverty. 
Nevertheless, the non-pension social transfers were found to be concentrated 
towards the bottom of the distribution to a larger extent than pensions and, in all 
non-Mediterranean countries, the combined contribution of the non-pension 
social transfers in reducing inequality was found to be larger than the 
corresponding contribution of pensions. 
The findings of the paper are broadly in line with the typology suggested by 
those authors who identify four types of Welfare State regimes in Europe 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990; Leibfried, 1993). The ‘rudimentary’ Mediterranean 
countries spend little on social protection, which consists mainly of pensions, 
and the redistributive role of social transfers is small. The ‘liberal’ regime of the 
UK and Ireland makes extensive use of means testing and, as a result, these 
countries’ transfers appear to be very effective at the margin, especially for 
poverty reduction. Denmark and (probably) the Netherlands belong to the 
‘social-democratic’ regime, with a high share of GDP devoted to social 
protection and the impact of social transfers on inequality and poverty very 
strong. Finally, the rest of the countries represent the ‘corporatist’ regime, where 
the share of social transfers in GDP is relatively high but the aggregate 
redistributive effects of these transfers are neither as strong as in the countries of 
the ‘social-democratic’ regime nor as effective in reducing inequality and 
poverty at the margin as in the countries of the ‘liberal’ regime. 
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